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FAIR CROSS-SECTION CHALLENGES IN MARYLAND:
AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Richard Seltzert
John M. Copacinot
Diana Roberto Donahoe#t
I. INTRODUCTION
The jury has played a central role in criminal jurisprudence since
the founding of the Republic.I The right to a jury trial is the only
guarantee included in both the body of the Constitution and in the
Bill of Rights;2 it has also been traced by some historians to the
Magna Carta.' The United States Supreme Court has viewed the jury
as the primary vehicle for protecting citizens from oppression by
their government 4 and has concluded that "trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 5
Given the weighty purposes that the criminal jury serves, the
Supreme Court has paid particular attention to the Sixth Amendment
t Professor, Department of Political Science, Howard University. Michael Fica
also provided valuable research assistance. Professor Seltzer would like to thank
the Office of the Public Defender of Maryland, who provided the resources
for the data collection discussed in this Article.
t Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and Director, Georgetown Crim-
inal Justice Clinic. Professor Copacino would like to thank Monique LaForce
for outstanding research contributions on an early draft of this Article. Ms.
LaForce worked on this Article as part of the pro bono program at Miller,
Cassidy, Larrocca & Lewin.
ti Instructor of Legal Research & Writing, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Albert W. Alshuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 867-70 (1994).
2. Id. at 870.
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 n.3 (1967) (citing Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855)).
4. In Duncan, the Court explained that the jury "gave [an accused] an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. In Baldwin v.
New York, the Court elaborated:
[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of
oppression by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused
and his accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps
than a judge or panel of judges, but who at the same time are less
likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government
that has proceeded against him.
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
5. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
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right to an impartial jury. 6 The Court has held that a defendant has
a right to a jury that is "truly representative of the community and
not the organ of any special group or class." 7 The Court has also
decreed that prospective jurors must be selected "without systematic
and intentional exclusion of any of these [distinct] groups" 8 and that
they must be selected from a pool that represents a "fair cross-
section" of the community.9
Defining the contours of the "fair cross-section" requirement,
however, has proved more elusive. In Duren v. Missouri,l0 the Court
established a specific test to evaluate an alleged violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair cross-section." The Court, however, has
yet to indicate clearly the method by which courts should measure
underrepresentation or the degree of underrepresentation sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. As a result, lower courts have applied
various methods, permitted different degrees of underrepresentation,
and produced inconsistent results. 12 This problem is especially appar-
ent in Maryland where the courts have denied fair cross-section
challenges despite significant, systematic underrepresentation on the
jury panel. 3
This Article examines the application of the Duren test and
evaluates compliance with the fair cross-section requirement of the
Sixth Amendment by courts in selected counties in Maryland. Part
II of this Article explains the historical background of the jury
selection system in Maryland. Part III analyzes the Duren test,
evaluates the various methods for determining disparities between
jury pool composition and the population, and proposes a method
for adoption. Part IV explains the application of this method to data
collected for capital cases raising Sixth Amendment issues in seven
Maryland counties. Part IV also describes the data collection, ana-
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. The Sixth Amendment provides in
part that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CossT. amend. VI.
7. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
8. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
9. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1975); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
10. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). For the state of the law prior to Duren, see Martha
Craig Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury Selection Procedures After Taylor
v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1975). See also Roger S. Kuhn, Jury
Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968); S. Ulmer,
Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960, AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 325 (1962).
11. For an explanation of the Duren test, see infra text accompanying notes 38-
40.
12. See infra notes 50, 52, 55, 65, 70, 75.
13. See infra part IV.D. and note 39.
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lyzes the results, and concludes that the use of voter roles as the
only source list for jury pools results in the underrepresentation of
African-Americans on those jury lists. Part V discusses the propo-
sition that the use of driver's license lists to supplement voter
registration lists is a simple and inexpensive remedy to the underre-
presentation caused by the use of voter lists. Finally, Part VI analyzes
the Maryland courts' rationale for continuing to uphold the use of
voter lists and concludes that the court decisions are inconsistent
with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE JURY
SELECTION PROCESS IN MARYLAND
A. The Keyman System
Prior to the mid-1960s, most court systems used some variation
of the "keyman" system in selecting jurors.' 4 Under this system,
prospective jurors were chosen by prominent members of the com-
munity who formed a jury commission and collectively chose people
known to be reputable.15 Under Maryland's "keyman" system, the
clerk of the court and the jury commissioner were responsible for
selecting potential jurors.' 6 They chose people from sources such as
telephone directories, membership lists of clubs and civic organiza-
tions, and members of the community such as priests, rabbis, state
officials, county court clerks, registers of wills, supervisors of elec-
tions, labor leaders, and other people with whom they were ac-
quainted.' 7 The clerk then sent jury questionnaires to the selected
people and filed the returned questionnaires according to the juror's
county of residence.' 8 When jurors were needed, the clerk drew
questionnaires from the file on a first-in, first-out basis. 19 The clerk
would then review the juror's questionnaire to determine whether the
juror met the statutory qualifications for jury service. 20 Certain
people, such as doctors, lawyers, dentists, nurses, school teachers,
14. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 548 (1979); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475, 479 (1954); see also United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 729
(D. Md. 1967).
15. For a discussion of the keyman system, see, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 275
F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, United States v. DiTommaso, 405
F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, DiTommaso v. United States, 394 U.S.
934 (1969), cert. denied, Waugaman v. United States, 394 U.S. 934 (1969).
16. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. at 729.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 730.
20. Id.
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and those with medical emergencies, were excused. 21 The jury com-
missioner approved those people who qualified and deposited a slip
of paper with the juror's name, age, address, occupation, and his or
her spouse's name and occupation in a box.22 About 400 to 600
prospective jurors' names were on file at one time.23 At the beginning
of each term, the United States Marshal summoned 40 to 45 pro-
spective grand jurors and 175 to 225 prospective petit jurors for jury
duty.
24
The Maryland keyman system, and systems similar to it that
were used in other states, often created jury pools that were not
representative of the population. 25 Even in the absence of intentional
discrimination by the clerk and jury commissioner, potential jurors
from numerous strata of the community never came to the attention
of those selecting the jury pool. 26
B. The Jury Selection and Service Act
The biases inherent in the keyman system and in other states'
similar systems led to the enactment of the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968 (the JSSA). 27 In changing the old system, Congress
sought to eliminate the influence of race or other impermissible
criteria to ensure that the jury lists were drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community. 2
Congress required each district to develop a plan for random
jury selection. 29 The Act required the use of voter registration lists
or lists of actual voters as the source for the initial selection of
names of prospective jurors.30 Voter lists were chosen for two reasons.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For a critique of the keyman system, see C. Lindquist, Analysis of Juror
Selection Procedure in the United States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 32
(1967). See also Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Report to House
Judiciary Comm., H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1795 (recognizing that keyman system is susceptible
to intentional discrimination and that even if intentional discrimination is
absent, the underrepresentation of certain groups is still unacceptable).
26. H.R. REp. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794 n.l.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1988).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794. The Act states
in part: "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross-section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes." 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1994).
30. Id. § 1863(b)(2).
[Vol. 25
Fair Cross-Section Challenges in Maryland
First, they provided "the widest community cross-section of any list
readily available."'" Second, they provided "an initial line of defense
against incompetence in the lists of potential jurors. 3 2 The Act,
however, required supplementation of the voter lists with other lists
when necessary to correct substantial deviations between the per-
centage of a group in the community and the percentage of that
group in jury pools.33 The Act did not define "substantial"; this
task was left to the courts.3 4
C. Maryland Law
The Maryland legislature enacted a statute very similar to the
JSSA in 1973. Like the JSSA, the Maryland statute's policy is to
31. H.R. REP. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794.
32. Id. at 1795. Because citizens were required to read, write, and understand
English in order to vote, and because these qualifications also apply to jury
service, the use of voter lists would automatically screen out many unqualified
jurors. Id.
33. The Act required that the plan "prescribe some other source or sources of
names in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect
the rights secured by [this Act]." 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1994). Furthermore,
legislative history reveals that, while the voting list need not perfectly mirror
the percentage structure of the community, "any substantial percentage devi-
ations must be corrected by the use of supplemental sources." H.R. REP. No.
1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794.
Even before this Act was passed by Congress, some analysts doubted
whether the use of voter registration lists would remedy perceived inadequacies
in the jury selection situation. As one commentator pointed out:
It becomes doubtful whether voter registration lists are capable of
producing juries representative of a cross-section of the community,
in view of the fact that the lists exclude over 30 million people, a
disproportionate number of whom are members of the lowest socio-
economic strata of society. Since congressional intent clearly indicates
a desire for federal juries to represent a cross-section of the commu-
nity, it would be a mistake to regard the pending legislation as a
panacea. What is needed are carefully thought out guidelines and
suggestions for judicial councils to supplement the registration lists.
Lindquist, supra note 25, at 49.
A number of studies have also revealed that jury pools drawn from voter
registration lists often underrepresent African-Americans, women, and young
people. The remedy most frequently advocated for this underrepresentation is
the use of multiple source lists such as driver licenses lists, tax rolls, and
welfare rolls. See, e.g., N. Benokratis & J. Griffin-Keene, Prejudice and Jury
Selection, 12 J. BLACK STUD. 427 (1982); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., et al., Jury
Selection as a Biased Social Process, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 9 (1976); Hayward
R. Alker, Jr. & Joseph J. Barnard, Procedural and Social Biases in the Jury
Selection Process, 3 JUST. SYs. J. 220 (1977-1978); L. Knowles & K. Hickman,
Selecting a Jury of Peers: How Close Do We Get?, 12 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN.
207 (1984); Mark Michael et al., Challenges to Jury Composition in North
Carolina, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1 (1975); G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T.
Munsterman, The Search for Jury Representativeness, I1 JUST. SYS. J. 59
(1986).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794.
19961
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ensure that juries "shall be selected at random from a fair cross-
section of the citizens of the State who reside in the county where
the court convenes." 5 The Maryland law mirrors the JSSA by using
voter registration lists as the primary source of the jury pool and by
using additional secondary sources if necessary to achieve a fair
cross-section of the community.1
6
III. APPLICATION OF THE DUREN TEST
The Supreme Court, in Duren v. Missouri,3 7 held that in order
to make out a prima facie case of a fair cross-section violation, a
defendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive
group in the community;"
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community;3 9 [and]
(3) [that] this underrepresentation is caused by systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.40
Once a defendant has made a prima facie case under these require-
ments, the burden shifts to the state to show a substantial state
interest which justifies the infringement. 41
35. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-102 (1993).
36. The Maryland counterpart to the JSSA provides: "The jury commissioner or
the clerk of the court shall select the names of prospective jurors from among
those persons 18 years old or older, whose names appear on the voter registration
lists, and from such additional sources permitted by a plan adopted under
section 8-201." Id. § 8-104.
37. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
38. Id. at 364.
39. Id. Merely pointing out that no one person of a particular race served upon
a particular jury is not sufficient for a defendant to prevail upon a cross-
section challenge. Adair v. State, 231 Md. 255, 256, 189 A.2d 618, 619 (1963);
Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359 (1962) (finding that African-
Americans have no constitutional right to be tried before a jury including
African-Americans). It is not necessary that a jury actually reflect a fair cross-
section of the community but only that the list of prospective names of jurors
be chosen in a selection process reasonably designed to produce a fair cross-
section. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Wilkins v.
State, 270 Md. 62, 310 A.2d 39 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 992 (1974).
40. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
41. Id. "'The right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational
grounds.' Rather, it requires that a significant state interest be manifestly and
primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process, such as
exemption criteria, that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive
group." Id. at 367-68 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975)).
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A. Prong One of the Duren Test: Cognizable Class
The first prong of the Duren test requires that the class under
consideration be "distinctive" or "cognizable." 42 The Supreme Court
first addressed the issue of cognizability in Strauder v. West Virgi-
nia.43 In Strauder, the Court held that African-Americans, who had
a distinctive heritage, culture and history, were a cognizable group. 44
Although courts define "cognizable" slightly differently, the
term is generally used to focus on a group's distinctive characteristics
and the unique nature of prejudice afflicting a group. 41 In Maryland,
the courts use a three-prong test to define cognizability.4 First, there
must be some factor that defines and limits the group.47 Second, the
group must have cohesion, a common thread or basic similarity in
attitudes, ideas or experience. 4 Third, the group must have a com-
munity of interest that cannot be adequately protected by the rest of
the populace. 49
B. Prong Two of the Duren Test: The Various Tests of Disparity
To determine whether the representation of a group in a venire
panel is fair and reasonable under the second prong of the Duren
42. Id. at 364.
43. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (recognizing that African-Americans are a cognizable class
and holding that a state law that excluded African-Americans from jury pools
violated equal protection).
44. Id.
45. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (relying on the courthouse
bathrooms, one unmarked and the other marked "Colored Men" and "Hom-
bres Aqui," and the unique culture and history of Hispanics as proof that
Hispanics could be distinguished from Caucasians); Murchu v. United States,
926 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.) (holding that defendant must show that group is
definable and limited by some clearly identifiable factor, such as a common
thread of experiences and a community of interests, so that the group's interest
cannot be adequately represented if group is excluded from the jury selection
process), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828 (1991); United States v. Guzman, 337 F.
Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that a group is distinct when it has
a shared attribute that defines or limits its membership and when it shares a
community of interest), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); Rubio v. Superior
Court, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (Ca. 1979) (defining cognizability using a two-prong
test, where first prong focused on distinctiveness and second prong focused on
discrimination); cf. United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir.) ("The
important consideration ... is not whether a number of people see themselves
as forming a separate group, but whether others, by treating those people
unequally, put them in a distinct group,"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988)
(emphasis in original).
46. Wilkins v. State, 270 Md. 62, 67, 310 A.2d 39, 41-42 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 992 (1974). See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
47. Wilkins, 270 Md. at 67, 310 A.2d at 41.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 67, 310 A.2d at 41-42.
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test, statistical evidence must be gathered and analyzed in order to
calculate the "disparity," or the amount of unequal representation,
of the cognizable group. Neither the Supreme Court nor the JSSA
has established clear standards for measuring underrepresentation or
for determining the level of underrepresentation required to establish
a violation. However, three methods of measuring disparity are most
commonly used: absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and a test
of statistical significance.
1. Absolute Disparity
Absolute disparity measures the difference between the percent-
age of a cognizable group in the population and the percentage of
that group represented in the jury pool.5 0 The formula for determining
absolute disparity is therefore extremely simple: Subtract the pro-
portion of the cognizable group in the population from the proportion
of that group in the jury pool. For example, in Baltimore County
in 1988, 12.2% of the population and 4.9% of the jury pool were
African-American. 1 The absolute disparity was 4.9 minus 12.2, or -
7.3.
Absolute disparity is the measure that has gained the widest
acceptance and that has been relied upon repeatedly by the federal
and the Maryland courts.5 2 Although the Supreme Court has never
indicated that absolute disparity is the preferred method for meas-
uring disparity, the Court used the method in Swain v. Alabama,"
a 1965 case in which the petitioner alleged that the absolute disparity
of African-Americans on the jury was a violation of the Fourteenth
50. United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) (holding
that prima facie discrimination exists when percentage of women serving on
juries is less than 15%); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1954)
(holding that prima facie discrimination exists when population consists of
14% Mexican-Americans and no one with Spanish surname has served on
county grand jury in last 25 years).
51. See supra Table 1.
52. Cynthia A. Williams, Note, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of
Voter Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 610 (1990); see, e.g., Duren,
439 U.S. at 364; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); United States
v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rosario,
820 F.2d 584, 585 n.1 (2d Cir. 1987) (declining to reevaluate use of absolute
disparity test for Sixth Amendment); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645,
648 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir.)
(finding that use of absolute disparity is proper), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980); Jenkins, 496 F.2d at 65; United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d
934, 970 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to reexamine the Jenkins test); Bailey v.
State, 63 Md. App. 594, 602-04, 493 A.2d 396, 400-01 (1985) (holding absolute
disparity is proper test for purposes of fair cross-section analysis).
53. 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965).
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Amendment's guarantee of equal-protection. In Swain, although the
petitioner demonstrated an absolute disparity of 10%, the Court,
nevertheless, held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 4 Thus, Swain has been interpreted
to require at least 10% absolute disparity for fair cross-section cases.
As such, courts have generally declined to find a Sixth Amendment
violation where absolute disparities are less than 10%."1
Absolute disparity, however, can be a misleading measure when
the percentage of the excluded group in the population is relatively
small because absolute disparity does not adjust for the size of the
population.16 Therefore, the absolute disparity test can produce seem-
ingly low levels of disparity in situations where common sense and
statistical analysis indicate significant underrepresentation. For ex-
ample, in 1990, 8.7% of the population in Montgomery County was
54. "We cannot say that purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satis-
factorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a community is
underrepresented by as much as 10o." Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (lth Cir. 1985)
(finding absolute disparity of 6.67407o for African-Americans and 5.52% for
Hispanics not to be fair cross-section violation); United States v. Pepe, 747
F.2d 632, 649 (lth Cir. 1984) (finding 7.607o absolute disparity for African-
Americans not to be a fair cross-section violation); United States v. Tuttle,
729 F.2d 1325, 1327 (lth Cir. 1984) (finding absolute disparity of 6.3307o for
African-Americans insufficient for prima facie showing of fair cross-section
violation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); United States v. Suttiswad, 696
F.2d 645, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding absolute disparity of 2.8% for
African-Americans and 7.7% for Hispanics to be insubstantial); Newberry v.
Willis, 642 F.2d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding 6.5% absolute disparity for
African-Americans to be "negligible"); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d
150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding absolute disparity of 7.2% for Indians
insufficient to show underrepresentation); United States v. Armstrong, 621
F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding absolute disparity of 2.83% for African-
Americans insufficient to show underrepresentation); United States v. Kleifgen,
557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding absolute disparity of 2.9% for
African-Americans and 4.7% for males insubstantial); United States v. Di-
Tommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 1968) (finding no underrepresentation
for blue collar workers where absolute disparity equaled 10.7%), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 934 (1969); Bailey, 63 Md. App. at 604, 493 A.2d at 400 (finding
evidence of absolute disparity of 13.5% to be insufficient to show an unfair
and unreasonable underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury pool).
But see Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942, 954 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (refusing
to adopt 10% absolute disparity rule).
56. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 98 (1977) (suggesting 200o
comparative disparity should be demarcation of substantial underrepresenta-
tion); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 818 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); cf. David
Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists,
65 CAL. L. REV. 776, 799 (1977) (suggesting that 15% comparative disparity
as the line of demarcation).
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African-American. 57 The total exclusion of African-Americans from
the jury pool would result in an absolute disparity of only 8.707o, a
permissible level under Swain, despite the fact that an African-
American resident would have no chance of serving on a jury.
Similarly, if an absolute disparity of 100o occurred in 1990 in Anne
Arundel County, which was then 11.47 0 African-American," the
result would be almost total exclusion of African-Americans in that
county. This disparity would be much more significant than a 1006
disparity in Prince George's County, which was 49.2076 African-
American in 1990.19 Accordingly, reliance on absolute disparity as
the only measure can produce inconsistent results, which understate
the true level of underrepresentation, 60 when the group under consid-
eration comprises substantially less than 507o of the population.
2. Comparative Disparity
Comparative disparity measures the probability that any one
person belonging to a particular cognizable group will be chosen to
be in a jury pool. Where the jury pool reflects a fair cross-section
of the community, a person belonging to a cognizable group would
have the same probability of being selected for a jury pool as would
the average citizen. In such a case, the comparative disparity would
be zero. 6' As the probability of a person's presence in the jury pool
decreases, the comparative disparity increases.
The formula for the comparative disparity ratio is:
PROPORTION IN POOL - PROPORTION IN POPULATION x 100
PROPORTION IN POPULATION
The numerator in the comparative disparity ratio is the absolute
disparity. By dividing the absolute disparity by the proportion of the
57. 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, MARYLAND, available in CD-ROM
v.6 Prepared by the Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C. 1991, Table
P12, P13.
58. Id.
59. A 10076 disparity in Prince George's County, where the population consists of
almost 5006 African-Americans, would indicate that an African-American's
chances of serving on a jury are reduced by one-fifth, or 2007o. In contrast, a
10% disparity in Anne Arundel County, where the population consists of
11.4% African-Americans, would indicate that an African-American's chances
of serving on the jury are reduced by almost 88%.
60. For this reason, the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System of the Judicial Conference recognized this problem in its 1976
report and concluded that the use of this test could produce distorted results.
The Subcommittee recommended using additional measures to avoid distorted
results. The Subcommittee report is appended to Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d
805, 836 (5th Cir. 1975). See Williams, supra note 52, at 611-12.
61. See, e.g., Kairys et al., supra note 56, at 790.
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group in the population, comparative disparity adjusts for the size
of the group.
A few examples will demonstrate how comparative disparity
operates. For these examples, assume a jurisdiction where African-
Americans constitute 25% of the population. If there are no African-
American members in the jury pool, the comparative disparity would
be 1000%.62 An African-American member of the population would
have a 100% lower chance of being a member of the jury pool. If,
in the same jurisdiction, the jury pool were 25% African-American,
the comparative disparity would be 000.63 An African-American
member of the population would have no reduced chance, or, in
other words, an equal chance, of being a member of the jury pool
as compared with the rest of the population. Finally, if African-
Americans comprise 12.5%o of the jury pool, the comparative dis-
parity would be -500o. 64 An African-American member of the pop-
ulation would have a 50076 lower chance of being a member of the
jury pool. Because comparative disparity accounts for the size of the
population, comparativt, disparity is a better measure of disparity
than absolute disparity when the percentage of the cognizable class
is substantially less than 5007o.
Some courts have recognized the benefits of the comparative
disparity test and have adopted its use.65 For example, the Supreme
62. In this case, the formula yields the following result:
0 -25
- x 100 = -100%25
63. This result is reached by using the comparative disparity formula:
PROPORTION IN POOL - PROPORTION IN POPULATION x 100
PROPORTION IN POPULATION
In this case, the numbers are as follows:
25 - 2525 x 100 = -0%25
64. Again using the appropriate formula:
PROPORTION IN POOL - PROPORTION IN POPULATION
PROPORTION IN POPULATION
The result is reached by the following calculation:
12.5 - 25
x 100 = -50%25
65. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972) (using comparative
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Court of California stated that it preferred the comparative disparity
method because it produced results that were unaffected by the
proportion of the population in the specified category. 66 By using an
example which assumed a small percentage of African-Americans in
the population, the court demonstrated that absolute disparity could
permit a violation of the fair cross-section principle, while compar-
ative disparity could help avoid such an intolerable result.
67
Social scientists suggest that comparative disparities that are
higher than 20076 should be considered evidence of significant dis-
parities. 68 For this reason, the Authors recommend that a 20076
comparative disparity be adopted as the level that establishes a prima
facie case of underrepresentation. Courts have not uniformly adopted
this policy, 69 and many have refused to find underrepresentation at
even higher levels of comparative disparity. 70
disparity test in upholding equal-protection challenge); Bradley v. Judges of
Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413, 416-17 n.8 (9th Cir. 1976); Waller v. Butkovich,
593 F. Supp. 942, 957 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (using, among other tests, comparative
disparity test); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298, 303 (E.D. La.
1973); cf. United States v. Butler, 615 F.2d 685, 686 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing
that absolute disparity method is not the sole method for evaluating fair cross-
section claims). But see United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65-66 (2d Cir.
1974) (rejecting comparative disparity analysis because, where small groups are
involved, small absolute disparities produce large comparative disparities), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Godfrey v. Francis, 613 F. Supp. 747, 758 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (rejecting defendant's claim where comparative disparity statistics
were presented because absolute disparity was proper test).
66. People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 445 (Cal.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
67. Id.
68. See VAN DYKE, supra note 56; Foster, 506 F.2d at 818; cf. Kairys et al., supra
note 56. Absolute disparity does not adjust for the size of the population.
However, when the group under examination represents 50% of the population,
absolute disparity is not problematic. For example, when the group represents
50% of the population, an absolute disparity of 100o (the point at which courts
often recognize that an underrepresentation problem exists) translates into a
comparative disparity of 20% ((50-40)/50).
69. See Waller, 593 F. Supp. at 957; United States v. Facchiano, 500 F. Supp.
896, 903 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (calling 20% comparative disparity a "helpful
guideline").
70. See United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that 4607o
comparative disparity is not substantial underrepresentation); United States v.
Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that comparative disparity of 46%
is not substantial); United States v. Levasseur, 704 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (D.
Mass. 1989) (holding that comparative disparity of 50.307o does not rise to level
of substantial underrepresentation although the court did find this comparative
disparity "troubling"); Perkins v. Grammer, 664 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 n.4 (D.
Neb. 1987) (concluding that comparative disparity was proper approach, but
finding no substantial underrepresentation when disparity was 490o); United
States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Or. 1976) (holding that
comparative disparity of 45.5% for African-Americans and 75% for Mexican-
Americans was not substantial).
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3. Tests of Significance
a. The Test and Its Deficiencies
Some courts have used a third approach to evaluate claims of
disparity, a "statistical significance" test. While statisticians use
several tests of significance, the Supreme Court of the United States
has used a standard deviation analysis. 7' This test uses a mathematical
formula 72 to measure the probability that a disparity between the
percentage of a cognizable group in the population and the percentage
of that group in the jury pool could have occurred by chance. 71 If
the probability of a chance occurrence of underrepresentation is very
low, a court may infer that the disparity was caused by the group's
underrepresentation on the jury source list. In contrast, if the prob-
ability of a chance occurrence of underrepresentation on the jury list
is sufficiently high, then a court may conclude that the underrepre-
sentation could have been the result of random choices from a
representative source list. Accordingly, a court will likely decide that
the statistics fail to make out a prima facie case.
71. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). For a discussion of the
Court's analysis in Castaneda, see infra note 74.
72. The probability is computed by determining the "Z score," or standard
deviation measure. For a sample size over 50, the Z score is determined by
the formula:
(Pp - Ps)
(Pp (100 - Pp))/N
Where:
Pp = proportion in the population
Ps = proportion in the sample
N = sample size
For smaller sample sizes, a test of significance based upon the T distribution
table is appropriate.
73. Thus, the term "test of significance" can be misleading. When a non-statistician
thinks of "significance," she asks whether the results are "important." In
contrast, a statistician uses "significance" to determine whether the results
could have occurred by chance. If it is unlikely that the results could have
occurred by chance, then the statistician deems the results to be "significant."
For example, it is extremely unlikely that if a coin is flipped 25 times it will
appear as heads every time. While not impossible, the probability that this will
occur is one chance in 33,554,432. If this were to happen, because the
probability is so low, one would conclude that it was not a chance occurrence.
Instead, one would conclude that the flipping was "fixed" in some way.
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The Supreme Court first used a test of significance in Castaneda
v. Partida,74 and lower courts have followed the high Court's lead. 75
74. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The Court in Castaneda considered an equal-protection
challenge to the jury pool, where the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the
county was 79.107o, but the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the jury pool
was 39% over an 11 year period. Id. at 495. Accordingly, the absolute disparity
was 40.107o, and the comparative disparity was 50.707o. The Court used a
statistical significance approach and discussed the likelihood that such a sub-
stantial departure could occur by chance. By using Z scores (standard deviation
analysis as the Court termed it), the Court calculated that the likelihood that
such a substantial departure could occur by chance was less than one in 10 to
the 140th power (Z= 12). Id. at 496 n.17.
The Castaneda Court noted that for large samples, a standard deviation
of "two or three" would cause a social scientist to question the randomness
of the jury selection. Id.; see also Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 312 n.17 (1977) (applying Castaneda standard deviation analysis
in an employment discrimination suit); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
630 n.9 (1972) (noting that chances were one in 20,000 that the disparity
between the percentage of African-Americans on grand juries occurred by
chance).
75. In Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit seized
upon the statistical analysis in Castaneda and Hazelwood and rejected the use
of absolute disparity in all racial discrimination cases. The court stated:
We now hold that, in all cases involving racial discrimination, the
courts of this circuit must apply a standard deviation analysis such
as that approved by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood before drawing
conclusions from statistical comparisons .... We reject the ... method
of evaluating discrimination through the comparison of straight racial
percentages. Such methodology is mathematically incorrect, and we
are of the opinion that it has been rejected by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 1082.
Because absolute disparity misapprehends what a test of significance ac-
tually measures, the Moultrie court's reliance on the test of significance alone
is misplaced. See infra part III.B.3.b.; see also Jefferson v. Morgan, 962 F.2d
1185, 1187 (6th Cir. 1992) (establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
where 5.907o of grand jurors were African-American while 18.5% of the
population of the county was composed of African-Americans and the number
of African-Americans was six standard deviations less than would be expected,
and the chance that the county would have randomly chosen only twenty
African-Americans to serve on jury panels was one billion to one); Alston v.
Manso, 791 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding standard deviation test appropriate
for analyzing whether minority underrepresentation was substantial and granting
petition for habeas corpus where odds of exclusion of African-Americans from
jury panel were three in one billion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987); Waller
v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942, 955 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (finding no substantial
underrepresentation where standard deviation ranged from 92.49 to 7.45, despite
the Moultrie finding that a standard deviation of two or three was sufficient
to find a violation, because sample sizes used skewed results and because
"comparing the standard deviation is only the starting point of a proper
analysis of a claim of substantial underrepresentation"); United States v.
Donohue, 574 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (D. Md. 1983) (finding no jury cross-
section violation where standard deviation was -3.298); Hillery v. Pulley, 563
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Nonetheless, a test of significance alone is inappropriate for deter-
mining disparity. The test does not directly indicate the magnitude
of disparity. Instead, the test merely shows whether a certain disparity
could have occurred by chance. The test is affected by both the
sample size7 6 and the magnitude of the disparity. With very large
samples, virtually any disparity will be considered significant. As the
sample size decreases, the level of significance (Z score) also declines.
Therefore, the use of a test of significance alone is not a dependable
or an accurate measure.
b. The Proper Use of a Test of Significance
While use of a test of significance alone may be inappropriate,
the test, nonetheless, has a role to play in the analysis of disparities.
The test measures the significance of the observed disparities and,
thus, indicates the reliability of the statistical analysis. Accordingly,
the test should operate in conjunction with comparative disparity or
absolute disparity to discount properly the possibility that the meas-
ured disparity in question could have occurred by chance.
To use a test of significance, one must first determine a decision
rule or a "criterion of significance." As an example, a decision rule
might state that if there is a 5% probability or greater that the results
could have occurred by chance, one would conclude that the results
did in fact occur by chance. Applied to the jury selection context,
this rule would state that if there is a 5% probability or greater that
the disparity in a specific case could have occurred by chance, one
would decide that the result could be caused by the sampling process.
Accordingly, one would conclude that a fair cross-section violation
had not been proven.
Statisticians have no hard-and-fast rule for deciding what the
criterion of significance level should be. However, the closer the
criterion of significance is to zero, the more likely one would conclude
that the results occurred by chance and, thus, that the statistics do
not evidence a fair cross-section violation.7 7 Most social scientists use
F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (discussing both standard deviation and non-
statistical evidence in determining whether fair cross-section violation existed,
and granting habeas corpus relief where standard deviation was approximately
three).
76. "Sample size" refers to the size of the selection from the larger group. In the
jury challenges discussed in this Article, sample size refers to the number of
juror questionnaires which were selected for analysis from the total number of
questionnaires returned.
77. In establishing a criterion of significance, statisticians consider the cost of
being wrong. In the context of fair cross-section challenges, a "Type I" error
occurs if one concludes that a disparity is systematic when in fact the disparity
was purely a function of chance. A "Type 1I" error is the opposite; in this
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.05 as the criterion of significance,'7  which corresponds to the two
standard deviations suggested in Castaneda.19 Similarly, the Authors
have adopted that level.
After a criterion of significance level is chosen (.05 will be used
throughout the remainder of this Article), that level is compared to
the probability level (called a p-value) in the individual case to
determine whether the disparity in question could have resulted by
chance. If the p-value is lower than .05, one would conclude that
the results were not caused by a chance occurrence.
4. Summary
To demonstrate that a substantial disparity exists, thereby meet-
ing the second prong of Duren, one must show: (1) the existence of
a sufficiently large disparity, as measured by either absolute disparity
or comparative disparity and (2) that the disparity is statistically
significant.80 Absolute disparity is an inaccurate measure when the
proportion of the cognizable class is substantially less than 50% of
the population. Therefore, this Article suggests that comparative
disparity is a more accurate measure in such circumstances. Finally,
although it is impossible to propose absolute rules, this Article
suggests that an absolute disparity of 10% (where the size of the
context, it occurs if one concludes the disparity is a chance occurrence when
it is actually caused by inequalities in the process of composing the jury pool.
If the cost of a "Type I" error is greater than the cost of a "Type II" error,
one will set a criterion of significance closer to zero. Conversely, if the cost
of a "Type II" error is greater than the cost of a "Type I" error, one will
set a higher criterion of significance level. One could argue that the criteria
should be set above .05 because if the disparity were improperly attributed to
chance an unredressed due-process violation would be created. The Authors
leave this argument aside.
78. DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. COLE, PH.D., STATISTICAL PROOF OF DIscRIM-
NATION 50 n. 101; NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, Jurywork: Systematic Techniques,
at 5-56 n.lll.l (Beth Bonora & Elissa Krauss eds., 1979); Michael 0. Finkel-
stein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination
Cases, 80 HARv. L. REV. 338 (1966); Kairys et al., supra note 56, at 792;
Munsterman, supra note 33, at 64 ("The cutoff probability normally used is
.05 . .. ").
79. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977). The Court in Castaneda
suggested that "two or three" standard deviations was significant. Id; at 496.
There is actually a large difference between Z scores of two and three. A Z
score of two translates into a p-value of .0454 (approximately 45 chances in
1000 of the event occurring by chance). A Z score of three translates into a
p-value of .0027 (approximately three chances in 1000). Most social scientists
would accept a Z score above 1.96 (p<.05) as indicating significance. Accord-
ingly, this Article has adopted that level.
80. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
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group approaches 50% of the population) or a comparative disparity
of 20% for smaller groups, coupled with a level of statistical signif-
icance of .05, should be accepted as sufficient evidence that under-
representation exists.
C. Prong Three of the Duren Test: Systematic Exclusion
Once the defendant has shown underrepresentation, it is his
burden to prove that this underrepresentation was caused by system-
atic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Systematic
underrepresentation means that the disparity is "inherent in the
particular jury-selection process utilized. 82 In Duren, the Court ruled
that the third prong of the test was met when the defendant made
an "undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy [in the per-
centage of women appearing in the jury panel] occurred not just
occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a
year." ' 83 The Court noted that this discrepancy "manifestly indicate[d]
that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic - that is
inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized." 8 4
Intent need not be shown for a disparity to be systematic. 5
Instead, "officials must adhere to a standard more stringent than
mere abstention from intentional discrimination; they have an affir-
mative duty to develop and pursue procedures aimed at achieving a
fair cross-section of the community. '8 6
81. Id.
82. Id. at 366. In Duren, the jury selection system at issue exempted women from
jury service upon request. The Court found that the system was flawed but
noted that when questionnaires were sent out randomly to registered voters,
no underrepresentation existed. On the other hand, when the jury wheel was
constructed (the next stage in the process), fewer than 30% of those summoned
were female, indicating that a substantial number of women who answered the
questionnaire claimed either ineligibility or exemption from service. Addition-
ally, women were given another opportunity to claim an exemption when they
were summoned and were presumed to have claimed an exemption if they did
not respond to the summons. This meant that the percentage of women who
appeared in the venire stage (14.5%) was much lower than the percentage of
women who were summoned for service (26.707o). Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See LaRoche v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500, 503 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that a
process, "however neutral on its face," systematically excludes a group if that
group is consistently and substantially underrepresented in the jury pools); cf.
People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433 (Cal.) (holding that high absolute disparity is
sufficient to show that random selection from racially-neutral voter lists sys-
tematically excludes blacks), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984). The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland criticized these opinions as holding that the third
prong was automatically satisfied whenever the second prong was satisfied. See
Bailey v. State, 63 Md. App. 594, 604-06, 493 A.2d 396, 401 (1985).
86. Harris, 679 P.2d at 446 (citing People v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d
966, 971-72 (Cal. 1974)).
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Although there is no standard to determine the duration of
underrepresentation necessary to prove systematic exclusion, the Duren
Court held that underrepresentation for a period of nearly a year
was systematic,' 7 and, in People v. Harris,88 the Supreme Court of
California held that underrepresentation for a period of three months
was systematic. 9
D. Rebuttal: The State Must Prove Significant State Interest
Once the defendant comes forward with facts sufficient to prove
a prima facie case of a fair cross-section violation by meeting the
first three prongs of the Duren test, the state has the high burden
of proving a significant state interest. 9° Thus, the state must justify
the infringement by showing that attaining a fair cross-section is
incompatible with a significant state interest. 9'
For example, if a defendant successfully demonstrated that Af-
rican-Americans were underrepresented as result of the use of voter
registration lists, the state would need to prove either that it had a
significant interest in using only voter registration lists or that the
use of a supplemental list, such as a driver's license list, would be
incompatible with a significant state interest.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DUREN TEST TO MARYLAND
JURIES
This section will apply the standards outlined in the previous
section to data on racial disparities from seven counties in Maryland.
Because it is clear that the first and third prongs of the Duren test
are readily satisfied,92 this section will focus primarily on the second
87. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
88. Harris, 679 P.2d at 445.
89. Id. at 442.
90. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368.
91. Id. at 368-69 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975)).
Additionally, in Duren, the lower court suggested that underrepresentation of
women might be a result of permissible exemptions and not a result of the
automatic exemption under examination. Id. at 368-69. However, the record
did not contain any proffer that the permissible exemptions caused the under-
representation, and, therefore, the state did not meet its burden of proof
beyond mere suggestions or assertions. Id. at 369.
92. The first prong requires that the group be a cognizable class. Id. at 364. The
courts have specifically held that African-Americans are a distinctive group.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The third prong
requires that the "underrepresentation [be] due to systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury selection process." Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
Weekly underrepresentation for a year in Duren was found to constitute
systematic exclusion. Id. at 366. The data which the Authors collected dem-
onstrates at least four years underrepresentation in each county. See infra
Table 1. Therefore, the systematic exclusion requirement is satisfied in this
study.
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prong - whether the representation of African-Americans in the
jury pool is fair and reasonable. The section will first describe the
process for selecting jurors and will then recount the data collection
process and discuss potential problems with the data collection meth-
ods. Finally, the section will analyze the data using the methods
outlined in the sections above.
A. Jury Selection Methods in Maryland
While each county in Maryland has its own jury selection proc-
ess, Prince George's County's process is typical and will be used as
a model. Four times a year the jury commissioner requests that the
Board of Registered Voters randomly draw approximately 7500 names
from its list of registered voters. 93 The people whose names are drawn
are sent jury qualification questionnaires. About 5000 people return
the questionnaires and, of the 5000, about 4200 are then qualified
by the jury commissioner. 94 Every week, 150 to 250 of the qualified
jurors are randomly selected and sent summonses. Over the course
of a term, approximately 2500 jurors are called. On an average week,
thirty jury trials occur. When a judge requests a jury panel, the jury
commissioner randomly chooses jurors from the pool of those sum-
moned for that day. Additionally, in each term twenty-three people
are chosen for service on the grand jury.95
Violations of a random selection of the population may occur
at five levels in this jury selection process. First, not all members of
the population over the age of eighteen are registered to vote. Those
who are not registered to vote are excluded from this process. Second,
despite a follow-up letter, many potential jurors do not return the
jury qualification questionnaire. Third, many jurors are disqualified
or excused by the jury commissioner in the initial screening of the
jury qualification questionnaires. Fourth, some jurors refuse the
93. Descriptions of jury selection procedures are based on the Authors' conversa-
tions with court officials during the process of gathering the statistics for the
jury challenges and on testimony in the circuit court in State v. Jackson, CT
84-1146 (1985). In some counties jury qualification questionnaires are mailed
twice a year, and the wheel is filled on a less frequent basis.
94. Jurors are disqualified if they: (1) are not United States citizens; (2) cannot
read, write and understand English; (3) have a felony conviction; or (4) have
a pending felony charge. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207 (1995).
In addition, citizens may opt out of jury duty if they: (1) are over the age of
70; (2) are a member of the militia; or (3) have served jury duty within the
last three years. Id. § 8-209. Jurors who ask for a medical hardship excuse
must present a letter from a doctor, while other hardship excuses, such as
work, family, and school, are disfavored. Some counties are more liberal in
granting these requests than others.
95. See supra note 93.
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summons for jury service. Fifth, some jurors who are summoned are
given late disqualifications or exemptions. 96
B. Gathering Data for the Jury Pools
1. The Method of Collection of Jury Pool Data
Maryland state law requires that jury qualification forms and
records regarding jury selection be preserved for at least four years. 97
Parties who challenge the jury selection procedures may request access
to those forms in order to prepare challenges. The Authors obtained
access to the data in connection with several challenges in death
penalty cases. 9
The data collection methods utilized in the seven selected Mar-
yland counties are described below. In those counties where all
questionnaires were not analyzed, questionnaires were chosen at
regular intervals, for example, every fourth questionnaire or every
fifteenth questionnaire.99 Different intervals were used in each county.
96. The use of peremptory challenges will also affect the representativeness of the
jury, and the Supreme Court has held that the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The constitutional concern with
representativeness, however, applies only to the pool of people called for jury
service, not to individual petit juries. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,
478-80 (1990).
97. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-212 (1989).
98. Access to these forms was granted in two cases in Prince George's County,
Bailey v. State, 84 Md. App. 323, 579 A.2d 774, cert. denied, 321 Md. 225,
582 A.2d 531 (1990) and State v. Jackson, CT 84-1146, Prince George's County
Circuit Court (1985), one case in Dorchester County, State v. King, CR 5012,
Dorchester County Circuit Court (1986), two cases in Caroline County, State
v. Malone, CR 3374, Caroline County Circuit Court (1989) and State v. Boyt,
CR 3872, Caroline County Circuit Court (1992), one death penalty case in
Anne Arundel County, State v. Colvin, CR' 25340, Anne Arundel County
Circuit Court, aff'd, Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 873 (1984), one case in Charles County, State v. Emanuel, CR 93-
101, Charles County Circuit Court (1994), and one case in Baltimore County,
State v. Wiggins, 88-CR-5464, Circuit Court of Baltimore County (1994). In
another case in Montgomery County, State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 511 A.2d
465 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987), the court allowed the petitioner
to examine data compiled by the jury commissioner's office.
99. Some counties in Maryland recently began computerizing the jury questionnaire
returns. Computerizing the returns will make analysis of jury data simpler and
more comprehensive. Prince George's County computerized its system in 1989
and Anne Arundel County began this process in 1993. However, data for this
study were gathered in these two counties prior to the computerization. Mont-
gomery County began maintaining information from the juror questionnaires
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In general, the data collectors attempted to choose an interval such
that 300 or more juror qualification questionnaires would be selected
for each year, in order to obtain an adequate sample size. The
process of selecting every "nth" questionnaire is equivalent to a
random sample; in fact, it is the same method that each county uses
to create the master jury wheel from the jury questionnaires. 10
The selection method for each of the seven selected Maryland
counties was as follows:
Anne Arundel County - Research assistants transferred infor-
mation from every fifteenth juror qualification questionnaire between
1980 and 1983 onto a coding form.
Baltimore County - For 1988 and 1989, a research assistant
transferred information from every fourth questionnaire. In 1990 and
1991, the county began using a one-day, one-trial juror selection
system. Therefore, in those years the research assistants chose a
questionnaire from every three-fourths of a linear inch of question-
naires. In 1992 and 1993, the Authors used the computerized data.
Caroline County - Research assistants transferred information
from every juror qualification questionnaire between 1986 and 1992.
This data collection occurred in two stages and was used for two
separate challenges.
Charles County - Research assistants transferred information
from every fourth questionnaire for the years 1989 to 1993.
Dorchester County - Research assistants transferred information
from every juror qualification questionnaire for the years 1983 to
1986.
Montgomery County - Montgomery County officials denied ac-
cess to the juror qualification forms. Information was obtained from
the court's computerized data base for the years 1979 to 1983.
Prince George's County - Research assistants transferred infor-
mation from every fifteenth juror qualification questionnaire for the
years 1979 to 1985. This data collection occurred in two different
time periods for two different cases.
The number of forms which included racial and age data are
shown in Table I and Table 2.
2. The Analysis of Missing Data
The jury questionnaire that is sent to a prospective juror requests
information on age, race, religion, and national origin. Pursuant to
in 1979, but not all information from the jury qualification questionnaires was
coded onto the computer. Baltimore County began using a computerized system
in January of 1990, but much of the computerized data was inadvertently
destroyed. Baltimore County officials provided the computerized data for 1992
and 1993.
100. See supra note 93.
19961
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 25
Maryland law, however, prospective jurors are free to decline to
provide this information,10 1 and the form provides an explicit notice
of that right. 10 2 As a result, it is likely that a number of prospective
jurors will not provide information on race.103
The refusal rate may affect the accuracy of the statistics on the
racial composition of the jury pool. For example, if the refusal rate
for African-Americans is significantly higher than other groups'
refusal rates, failure to account for those African-Americans who
refuse to answer the race question will understate the true percentage
of African-Americans in the jury pool. In contrast, if the refusal
rates for all groups are the same, the statistics from those people
who answered the question will yield an accurate measure of the
racial composition of the pool. Thus, to be certain of the accuracy
of the data, one must find some way to determine the race of the
jurors who decline to provide race information.
101. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-202.5(iii) (1995) states:
The form shall make clear to the person that furnishing any infor-
mation with respect to his race, religion, or national origin is not a
prerequisite to his qualifications for jury service, and that this infor-
mation need not be furnished if the person finds it objectionable to
do so.
Id.
102. Since 1982, for most counties, the form places the questions concerning race,
religion, and national origin in a separate box, with the following notice: "The
furnishing of any information with respect to your race, religion, or national
origin is not a prerequisite to your qualification for jury service: and such
information need not be furnished if you find it objectionable to do so."
Prior to 1982, the race, religion, and national origin questions were not
placed in a box and the instructions merely stated, "If you object, you need
not answer [the] Questions on line 5. Failure to answer will not disqualify you
from jury service."
103. Since the inauguration of the new form in 1982, the number of prospective
jurors who declined to provide race information (the "refusal rate") has
increased substantially. The average refusal rate for race on the old form was
1701o; the refusal rate on race for the new form was 29.7%, over 10% points
higher. Across six counties, the refusal rate for race ranged from 17.9% in
Anne Arundel County to 29.7% in Caroline County. In contrast, the age
refusal rate averages under 501o.
The effect of the form on the refusal rate is most clearly seen in Baltimore
County. The race refusal rate in Baltimore County, beginning in 1990, was
71.5076, more than double the average refusal rate. The apparent reason for
this jump in the refusal rate is that the court in Baltimore County changed
the jury qualification form in 1990.
The pertinent part of the form prior to 1990 stated: "The furnishing of
any information with respect to your race, religion, or national origin is not
a prerequisite to your qualification for jury service; and such information need
not be furnished, if you find it objectionable to do so." The 1990 form states:
"THE DATA IN THIS BOX IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR JURY DUTY
AND MAY BE LEFT BLANK." (Original is capitalized).
For obvious reasons, jurors are far more likely to refuse to answer the race
question on the 1990 form.
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One method is to impute the race of the jurors who did not
answer the race question by using other information provided by the
juror, such as education, occupation, and zip code.104 Such techniques
were applied to questionnaires in eight of the nine cases discussed
below, and the questionnaires revealed that item-refusal rates on the
race question were similar for African-Americans and Caucasians. 10
While this technique has been accepted by statisticians, some courts
have rejected the technique on the ground that it is too speculative. 1°6
The Authors used more direct methods in one other county to
account for missing data. In Caroline County, the "jury eligible"
population in 1990 was 19,935. The number of residents who were
sent jury qualification questionnaires over a given year ranged from
546 to 687. For all prospective jurors who refused to answer the race
question over a three term period (1991 and the first term of 1992),
the court clerk, the jury commissioner, and the respective postmasters
were asked if they could identify the person's race. 0 7 They were
asked only about the last eighteen months of jury duty, on the
assumption that the recall of the various personnel would be more
accurate for more recent years. When the person's race could not be
determined by these methods, the jury pool member was contacted
to obtain the information. Although there are problems with having
one person identify the race of another,10 s the error rate in this
context is manageable.
104. To make this imputation, the Authors analyzed the questionnaires from all
people in a specific zip code, determined the racial percentages of the people
who answered the race question, and projected the same percentages for those
people who refused to answer the race question. For example, if analysis of
the questionnaires for the people living in zip code 20912 who answered the
race question show that 60% were Caucasian, and if 10 jurors from that zip
code did not answer the race question, one would impute that 6 (60%) of the
10 jurors were Caucasian. The Authors used this imputation for all those who
did not answer the race question.
105. In State v. Calhoun, access to the raw questionnaires was denied, and impu-
tations were not possible.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(stating that questionnaires which did not include race should not be used in
statistical analysis). Courts have also rejected the technique because it is too
complicated. In Biaggi, the court noted that the "ideal treatment of the
incomplete and lost questionnaires in the present case would probably have
been to use the Census Bureau's procedure to impute racial and ethnic values
where they were lacking." Id. at 647. However, since the method was both
complicated and time consuming, the court stated that the next best procedure
was to leave those questionnaires out altogether. Id.
107. Because the county is rather small, the Authors postulated that court personnel
would know many of the residents who received jury qualification question-
naires.
108. See generally Robert A. Hahn, et al., Inconsistencies in Coding of Race and
Ethnicity Between Birth and Death in U.S. Infants, 267 JAMA 259 (1992).
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In the two terms of 1991 and the first term of 1992, 1018
prospective jurors received juror questionnaires. Of that group, 30.9%,
or 315 prospective jurors, refused to answer the race question. Race
data were ascertained for all but 7 (2.200) of the 315 jurors who
refused to answer this question. The percentage of African-Americans
among those who did not answer the race question was 8.6607o. The
percentage of African-Americans among those who returned jury
qualification questionnaires was 9.20%. Although Caucasians were
somewhat less likely than African-Americans to answer the race
question, this difference was not statistically significant (Z =0.37).
Imputation techniques and more direct methods of determining
the race of those who refuse to answer the race question have shown
that the refusal rates are approximately the same for African-Amer-
icans as for other racial groups. Therefore, the use of the racial data
from those who answered the questions should provide an accurate
depiction of the racial makeup of the jury pool.
C. The Use of Census Data to Determine Community
Composition
In order to determine whether the racial composition of the jury
pool is a fair cross-section of the community, one must also determine
the racial composition of the community. Data from the Bureau of
the Census is the most comprehensive source for this information.
Racial estimates have been used for 1980 and 1990 from the Bureau
of the Census. 1°9 For the years between 1980 and 1990, the percentage
of African-Americans was extrapolated by assuming a constant change
for the racial ratio between the 1980 Census and the 1990 Census. 10
The accuracy of Census data has been questioned on several
grounds. Some people claim that Census data is inaccurate because
such data includes members of the community who are ineligible for
109. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION: GENERAL
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS - MARYLAND, WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1982, Table 45; 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING, MARYLAND, available in CD-ROM v.6 Prepared by the Bureau of
the CeIsus, Washington, D.C. 1991, Table P12, P13.
110. Until the results of the 1990 Census were released, the Bureau of the Census
did not have racial estimates for years after 1980. In most of the court
challenges, the Authors used racial estimates derived from the Maryland
Department of State Planning for the years after 1980. See MARYLAND DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE PLANNING, OFFICE OF PLANNING DATA, FINAL POPULATION
PROJECTIONS, INDIVIDUAL YEARS, 1980-1990 (Sept. 1984). The Maryland De-
partment of State Planning does not have racial estimates for the African-
American population. Rather, they provide estimates for the non-Caucasian
population. The Authors divided the non-Caucasian population into "African-
Americans" and "Others" by using the proportionate breakdown from the
1980 U.S. Bureau of the Census data.
[Vol. 25150 Baltimore Law Review
1996] Fair Cross-Section Challenges in Maryland
jury duty: non-citizens, members of the armed forces, and felons."1
If a disproportionate percentage of these groups are African-Amer-
ican, then the percentage of African-Americans in the Census data
will not be an accurate measure of the percentage in the population
who are eligible for jury service.
No data exists, however, to support the argument that members
of these three groups are disproportionately African-American. Fur-
thermore, even if one assumes such disproportion, the number of
people who fall into these categories is minimal and does not affect
the overall percentage estimates. For example, in Baltimore County,
non-English-speaking citizens comprised 1 % of the population, in-
mates of institutions comprised 1.50%0, and non-citizens comprised
2.4%.112 Assuming that all or most of these groups were African-
American would cause only slight changes in the overall disparities.
Census data has also been attacked on the ground that such
data underestimates the number of African-Americans in the popu-
lation. Most analysts estimate that if one took into consideration
this undercounting, the African-American percentage of the popula-
tion would be at least one-half of one percent higher." 3 Given this
underrepresentation in the Census data, the use of the such data to
111. See, e.g., United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 n.13 (1st Cir. 1970)
(noting that a greater disparity would be accepted where general population
figures were used since they do not accurately reflect the number of persons
actually eligible for service under valid statutory conditions), overruled by
Baber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (overruling case on the issue of
cognizability of young people); People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 442 (Cal. 1984)
(noting that while criticism has been leveled against the use of Census lists in
cross-section challenges, "eligible population figures are almost impossible to
obtain" (quoting Kairys et al., supra note 56, at 786 n.63)); Illinois v. Flores,
549 N.E.2d 1342, 1346 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (criticizing the use of seven year
old Census data).
112. These estimates are derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POPULATION: GENERAL SOCIAL AND EcoNoMIc CHARACTERISTICS - MARY-
LAND, summary tape file 3A, available in CD-ROM v.6 Prepared by the Bureau
of the Census, Washington, D.C. 1992.
113. See J. PASSEL ET AL., COVERAGE OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION IN THE 1980
CENSUS, By AGE, SEX, AND RACE: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES BY DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982. For
1990, the Bureau of the Census conducted the Post Enumeration Survey (PES).
This data was released in the form of a press release: Census Bureau Releases
Refined Estimates From Post Enumeration Survey of 1990 Census Coverage
- June 13, 1991. The PES surveyed 165,000 housing units after the actual
Census enumeration. The answers were matched with those arising from the
actual enumeration. The PES found a total undercount of 2.1 % and an African-
American undercount of 4.8%. If one used this survey to project Caroline
County, for example, the proportion of the county that would be African-
American is 16.17% instead of 15.76%. See also Williams, supra note 52, at
605-08 (noting Census undercounting of minorities and citing studies).
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determine the percentage of African-Americans works to the disad-
vantage of those who claim a violation." 4 In contrast, however, when
the Census data demonstrates sufficient disparity to establish a prima
facie violation, it is likely that a disparity exists and that the data
does not overstate the violation.
D. Results: Racial Disparity in Maryland Juries
The data displayed in Table 1 represents the racial disparities in
the seven Maryland counties that were investigated for this study.
The data shows that if one uses an absolute disparity test with a
threshold of 10% disparity required to establish a prima facie case," 5
only Prince George's County shows sufficient underrepresentation."
6
Because the other counties have smaller African-American popula-
tions, the absolute disparities range from -2.00% to -9.95%, which
is below the level necessary to establish a prima facie case.17
However, when one uses the test that this Article has suggested
for groups comprising a smaller portion of the population - com-
parative disparity and a .05 test of significance - statistically sig-
nificant disparities occur for six of the seven counties."18 The
comparative disparities in Anne Arundel County (-42.7%), Baltimore
County (-58.3%), Caroline County (-31.7%), Charles County (-29.9%),
114. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 52, at 606-08 (advocating adjustment of Census
data to consider the undercount of minorities).
115. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing absolute disparity test
and 10% threshold).
116. Prince George's County, which had an African-American population from
34.3% to 41.907o during the six years in which data were collected, had absolute
disparities ranging from -10.5% to -18.50.
117. A look at the average percentage of African-Americans and the average absolute
disparities in the counties studied clearly shows the inadequacy of the absolute
disparity method for smaller minority populations. In Anne Arundel County,
the average African-American population was 11% and the average absolute
disparity was -4.70o. In Baltimore County, the average African-American
population was 12.18% and the average absolute disparity ranged from -5.257o
to -9.950. In Caroline County, the average African-American population was
15.8% and the average absolute disparity was -50%o. In Charles County, the
average African-American population was 17.7% and the average absolute
disparity was -5.3%. In Dorchester County, the average African-American
population was 27% and the average absolute disparity was -4.4%. In Mont-
gomery County, the average African-American population was 8.77o and the
average absolute disparity was -4%.
118. Specifically, there are significant disparities for all years but one in Anne
Arundel County, all years in Baltimore County, all years in Charles County,
all years but one in Caroline County (that year was of borderline significance),
two of four years in Dorchester County, and all years in Prince George's
County. Yearly data was not available for Montgomery County, but the
disparity was significant when the five years were pooled.
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Montgomery County (-46.0%), and Prince George's County (-36.0%)
were substantial and easily satisfied the threshold of 20% that this
Article has suggested." 9 These disparities indicate a jury selection
system that systematically discriminates against African-Americans.
Only in Dorchester County, where the comparative disparity is 16.307o,
does the data indicate that the disparities are insufficient to establish
a prima facie case. In Baltimore County, with a comparative disparity
of -58.300, an African-American had a 58% lower probability of
serving in the jury pool than another citizen. 20
These disparities are not only large, they are statistically signif-
icant.'2' When combining all years together, the likelihood that the
measured disparity for each county occurred by a chance selection
from a representative list is far below .05, the level that this Article
has established as a criterion of significance. 122 The disparities likely
resulted from source lists that did not provide a fair cross-section of
the community rather than from chance in the sample selection.
V. A REMEDY TO DISPARITY
There is a very simple remedy to the large and statistically
significant disparities found in this study - the use of more than
one source list for the jury pool. The use of driver's license lists in
addition to voter registration lists would end the disparity and would
be inexpensive and administratively simple to implement.
When Census data is compared to data from the Department of
Motor Vehicles rather than from voter registration lists, the disparities
in the representation of the non-Caucasian population are dramati-
cally reduced. For example, the absolute disparities range from a
low of -0.8% in Charles County to a high of -3.91% in Montgomery
119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
120. Previous research has also found significant racial disparities in jury compo-
sition in Worcester County in the mid-1980s. See David Honig, Worcester
County, Maryland-A Dream Deferred, 27 How. L.J. 91, 93 (1984).
121. See supra part III.B.3.a. for a discussion of the term "significance."
122. A Z score of 5.20 for Anne Arundel County translates into a p-value of
approximately 5.4 x 10-7; a Z score of 8.67 for Caroline County translates into
a p-value of 1.9 x 10-17; a Z score of 5.92 for Charles County translates into
a p-value of 9.7 x 10"; a Z score of 3.41 for Dorchester County translates
into a p-value of 1.0 x 10-3; a Z score of 30.0 for Montgomery County
translates into a p-value of 9.6 x 10-197; and a Z score of 13.2 for Prince
George's County translates into a p-value of 3.4 x 10 - 39. It is difficult to
combine years in Baltimore County because of different sampling methods.
However, in 1992, the Z score of 13.91 translated into a p-value of 3.7 x 10-
43. The Z scores were very high in Baltimore County and Montgomery County
(1992-93) because the Authors has data on the entire computerized jury pool.
Because the sample is so large, the likelihood that such a large disparity
occurred in a random sampling is minuscule.
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County. In fact, the absolute disparities between the driver's license
lists and the Census data were lower in every county than were the
disparities between the voter lists and the Census. 23
In addition, the test this Article has suggested generates com-
parative disparities well under the 20% threshold in every county
except Montgomery County, ranging from a low of -2.35% in Prince
George's County to a high of -14.74% in Caroline County. 24 It is
clear, therefore, that combining both lists would produce a jury pool
that is representative of the population.
There are two reasons why driver's license lists are more repre-
sentative of the population than voter registration lists. First, the
driver's license lists are more inclusive. Table 4 shows that only
about 50% to 60% of the population of any one county is registered
to vote. However, over 90% of the population is licensed to drive.
Second, a smaller percentage of African-Americans register to
vote than Caucasians. Neither the counties nor the State of Maryland
collects data on the racial characteristics of those who register to
vote. The best source of this data is the Bureau of the Census which
publishes a bi-annual special voting supplement to the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). 25 For its data collection, the CPS interviews
123. The absolute disparities were as follows:
County Voters List Drivers List
Anne Arundel -4.70% -1.66%
Baltimore -7.10% 1.11%
Caroline -5.00% -2.45%
Charles -4.7007o -1.66%
Dorchester -4.4007o -1.88%
Montgomery -4.00% -3.91%
Prince George's -13.807o -1.30%
124. The comparative disparities were as follows:
County Voters List Drivers List
Anne Arundel -42.7307o -11.98%
Baltimore -58.3% 7.49%
Caroline -31.65% -4.00%
Charles -29.90o -14.74%
Dorchester -16.30% -6.93%
Montgomery -45.98% -20.36%
Prince George's -36.03%. -2.35%
125. For 1990 data on racial characterization of those who register to vote, see U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 453,
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1990, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991. Other years are similarly covered.
For 1984, state data was not provided in Voting and Registration in the
Election of November 1984, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1995. Jerry Jennings of the Population Division of the Bureau of the
Census was able to supply the Authors with the missing data.
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approximately 60,000 households each month. For the special sup-
plement to the CPS, respondents were asked whether they were
registered to vote, whether they voted in the most recent election,
and whether they were a citizen. Although helpful, this data is not
completely reliable because survey participants generally tend to
overreport their participation in the voting process. 126 This overre-
porting is greater for minorities.127 Nevertheless, it shows that Afri-
can-Americans are underrepresented on voter registration lists.
Table 5 shows the proportion of Caucasians and African-Amer-
icans who were registered to vote in all election years between 1980
and 1992 in the State of Maryland. African-Americans were less
likely than Caucasians to register to vote in all years except 1988,
when the proportions were about equal. Because this underrepresen-
tation does not appear on driver's license lists, using such lists to
supplement the voter list will remedy the underrepresentation.
Using driver's license lists to supplement voter registration lists
is a remedy that is inexpensive and administratively simple to imple-
ment.'12 A number of states currently use more than one source list
without apparent difficulty. 29 Only Oklahoma uses solely driver's
license lists to chose its venires. 130 The Maryland Jury Selection statute
already provides for the ability to supplement voter registration lists
126. See Williams, supra note 52, at 607 n.115.
127. See Paul R. Abramson & William Clagett, Race-Related Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout, 46 J. POL. 719, 721 (1984).
128. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. There is also some evidence
that if multiple source lists were used, there might be greater voter registration.
Some people refuse to register to vote because they wish to avoid jury duty.
In each of the challenges conducted, there were jurors who were "disqualified"
because they told the jury commissioner that they were removing their names
from the list of registered voters. See also Stephen Buckley, Some in Maryland
Use Polling Booth Detour to Escape Jury Duty, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1991,
at BI.
129. See Amxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-301 (1992); CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-
221, 222(a) (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.01, 40.011 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1994); HAW. REv. STAT. § 612-11 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 2-206 (1990);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 705, para. 305/1 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607A.22
(West 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29A.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1252-A (West Supp. 1995); MICH. CoPn. LAWS
ANN. §§ 600.1310(1), (4) (West Supp. 1994); NEE. REV. STAT. § 25-1628 (1989);
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 483.225, 704.147 (Michie 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:70-4 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-3 (Michie Supp.
1995); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 16-506 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-2
(1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 10.215 (1995); S.C. CODE AN. § 14-7-130 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIEMD LAWS ANN. § 16-13-4.1 (Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-2-302 (1994); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.001 (West
1988 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-5 (1994).
130. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 18 (West 1990).
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with additional lists. 3' In fact, four counties on the Eastern Shore
now supplement the voter registration lists with a list from the Motor
Vehicle Administration.3 2 With the use of high-speed computers, this
process is relatively easy and inexpensive to implement. Expert tes-
timony in a recent case in Baltimore County indicated that it would
cost $3800 to merge the lists for the first year and $2800 per year
thereafter; the same testimony indicated that merging the lists would
take one day. 133
VI. THE REMEDY AND MARYLAND COURTS
As the previous discussion reveals, there is clear underrepresen-
tation of African-Americans on jury source lists and there is a simple
and inexpensive device available to remedy this disparity. Courts in
Maryland, however, have been unwilling to find that the current
system violates the Sixth Amendment. This section will analyze the
courts' reasoning and will suggest that much of it results from a
misunderstanding of the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.
Since 1973, the Maryland courts have held that the use of voter
registration lists in the jury selection process does not deprive a
defendant of his right to be tried by a jury selected from a fair
cross-section of the community. 3 4 These decisions have rested on
131. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-104 (1995); accord ALA. CODE
§ 12-16-57 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 9.20.050 (1994); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
197 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-107 (West
Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4504(a), 4507 (Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-12-40 (1990 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-5.5-7
(West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-162 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-
05 (Supp. 1991); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (Anderson 1993); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 4521 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 953 (1988); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756.04 (West Supp.
1995); WYo. STAT. § 18-3-402(a)(xix) (1977).
132. These counties are Dorchester, Worchester, Wicomoco, and Caroline. Testi-
mony of David Malinger, a computer analyst from Data Services, Inc. for
Baltimore County. Wiggins v. State, 88-CR-5464, Circuit Court of Baltimore
County, (1994).
133. Id.
134. Wilkins v. State, 270 Md. 62, 310 A.2d 39 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 992
(1974); see State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 710-11, 511 A.2d 461, 470 (1986)
(holding that evidence did not support challenge to voter registration lists as
underrepresenting African-Americans because: (1) there was no showing of the
potential impact of using motor vehicle registration lists, (2) census figures
might have included blacks who were non-citizens, and (3) there was no
accounting for high refusal rate among those who did not answer race question),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 106, 472 A.2d
953, 962 (holding that defendant must show use of voter registration lists
resulted in purposeful discrimination), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Moore
v. State, 84 Md. App. 165, 171, 578 A.2d 304, 307 (finding selection of
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several bases. First, relying upon isolated language from the legislative
history of the JSSA, 135 federal courts in Maryland have approved the
potential jurors from the lists of registered voters constitutional because no
evidence existed that list failed to provide a representative cross-section), cert.
denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256 (1990); Bailey v. State, 63 Md. App. 594,
604, 493 A.2d 396, 400 (finding a -13.5% absolute disparity between the
number of African-Americans in the population and the number of African-
Americans in the jury pool to be insufficient to show unfair and unreasonable
underrepresentation), cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985); Miller
v. State, 53 Md. App. 1112, 452 A.2d 180, 186 (1982) (holding defendant's
comparison of the jury array to the city's general population, rather than to
the list of registered voters, to be improper); Johnson v. State, 44 Md. App.
515, 521, 411 A.2d 118, 121-22 (1980) (holding that defendant failed to provide
statistical evidence demonstrating the underrepresentation of grand juries as
compared to the number of African-Americans in the total population); see
also United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448-49 (4th Cir.) (holding mere
underrepresentation of black males on voter registration lists to be insufficient
to establish a violation of the Constitution because no cognizable group could
be systematically excluded from the lists), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988);
Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding petitioners'
methodology to prove underrepresentation to be incorrect because it compared
the percentage of African-Americans in the county instead of the percentage
of African-Americans on voter registration lists); United States v. Blair, 493
F. Supp. 398, 407 (D. Md. 1980) (holding mere underrepresentation of African-
American males on voter registration lists to be insufficient to establish a
violation of the Constitution because neither economic nor social characteristics
prevent a person from registering to vote), aff'd, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1981).
In addition, there have been a number of unpublished opinions on point
in Maryland that have held that the selection process does not deprive the
defendant of a fair cross-section community. See State v. Wiggins, 88-CR-
5464, Circuit Court of Baltimore County (1994) (finding that three prongs of
Duren had been met but holding that defendant did not prove that merger of
source list could have occurred in 1988, the year of trial, despite testimony
that lists could have been merged in 1988); State v. Emanuel, CR 93-101,
Charles County Circuit Court (1994) (following the Court of Appeals of
Maryland holding that it was permissible to use voter registration list as sole
source list); State v. Boyt, CR 3872, Circuit Court of Caroline County (1992)
(same); State v. Jackson, Circuit Court of Prince George's Cornty (1985)
(adopting reasoning of trial court in Bailey); State v. Colvin, CR 25340, Circuit
Court of Anne Arundel County (1985) (absolute disparity of 4.9% permissible),
aff'd, Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873
(1984).
135. The House Report to the Judiciary Committee provides:
In a sense the use of voter lists as the basic source of juror names
discriminates against those who have the requisite qualifications for
jury service but who do not register or vote. This is not unfair,
however, because anyone with minimal qualifications - qualifications
that are relevant to jury service - can cause his name to be placed
on the list simply by registering or voting. No economic or social
characteristics prevent one who wants to be considered for jury service
from having his name placed in the pool from which jurors are
selected.
H.R. REp. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794-95.
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use of voter registration lists, despite underrepresentation of African-
Americans on those lists, because African-Americans are allowed to
register to vote. The Fourth Circuit, for example, has concluded that
"there is no violation of the jury cross-section requirement where
there is merely underrepresentation of a cognizable class by reason
of failure to register, when that right is fully open."' 13 6
This reasoning misconstrues both the JSSA and the fair cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. The JSSA explicitly
states that it is the policy of the United States that litigants have the
right to juries "selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community,"' 37 and the JSSA requires the use of supplemental lists
when the voter registration lists result in an unfair cross-section. 38
Given these explicit provisions, a more reasonable interpretation of
the legislative history is that discrimination against those who do not
register to vote is of no consequence as long as the voter list provides
a fair cross-section of the community.
Furthermore, by focusing on an African-American's right to
vote, and thus to be eligible for the jury pool, the court is focusing
on a potential juror's right to equal protection under the law. This
right is not at issue in a Sixth Amendment cross-section claim.
Instead, the court should focus on, the right of a defendant to be
tried by a jury drawn from a pool representative of the community. 3 9
-Intentional discrimination or the availability of equal access to jury
service is simply irrelevant in Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
cases. 40
136. Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1448; see also Blair, 493 F. Supp. at 407 (relying on JSSA
to hold that voter registration lists were fair because no group was prevented
from voting).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
138. Id. § 1863(b)(2) (1994) ("The plan shall pres&ibe some other source or sources
of names in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and
protect the rights secured by . . .this title.").
139. Williams, supra note 52, at 593 (confusing equal protection with Sixth Amend-
ment).
140. Until 1968 a defendant in state court could only rely on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the composition of a jury
venire. However, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme
Court began the process of applying the Bill of Rights, including the Sixth
Amendment, to the states. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the
Court held that "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross
section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial," thereby opening the door to fair cross-section challenges
in state court. Id. at 528.
In contrast to an equal-protection challenge, a fair cross-section challenge
does not require any showing that the state intentionally excluded jurors. See
Castenada v. Partida, 339 U.S. 482, 510 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[A
defendant] need only show that the jury selection procedure 'systematically
[Vol. 25
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Also, courts have misused the voter registration lists by com-
paring the percentage of the cognizable group in the venire to the
percentage of the cognizable group on the voter registration list to
determine the level of underrepresentation in the venire. The appro-
priate level of underrepresentation can only accurately be obtained
by comparing the percentage of the cognizable group in the venire
to the percentage of the cognizable group in the local population.
For example, in Moultrie v. Martin,'41 the Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendant's suggestion that the percentage of African-Americans
in the county was the proper statistic to compare with the percentage
of African-Americans on grand juries. The court reasoned that "the
use of this statistic for this purpose is inappropriate because the
grand jury membership was based on the county voting rolls.' 1 42 If
one accepts the Moultrie court's reasoning, there would be no vio-
lation even if no African-Americans were registered on the voter
rolls. This reasoning is obviously incorrect. The Constitution, the
JSSA, and the laws of Maryland require a jury pool that is a fair
cross-section of the community. The JSSA's use of the voter regis-
tration rolls is simply a means of attempting to achieve that cross-
section. 43 Voter rolls should not be accorded such sacred deference
if they do not achieve that goal. 1" As other federal courts have
recognized, the proper basis for comparison is the local community. 145
exclude[s] distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail[s] to be rea-
sonably representative thereof."'). An equal-protection challenge to jury com-
position focuses on an individual's right to have the same chance of being
chosen for the jury venire as any other citizen. In contrast, a Sixth Amendment
challenge focuses on a defendant's right to a jury composed of a fair cross-
section of the community. Thus, even if there is no equal protection violation
because there was no discrimination in the selection of the jury venire, there
may be a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation. In effect, the Sixth
Amendment imposes an affirmative duty to ensure that "distinctive groups"
are not disproportionately excluded or underrepresented on the jury venire.
141. 690 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1982).
142. Id. at 1082; see also Miller v. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 12, 452 A.2d 180, 186
(1982) ("[Defendant] has drawn his conclusions by comparing the array in this
case with the city's general population. However, the jurors were not selected
from the city's general population. Instead, ... the jury was drawn from the
city's list of registered voters.").
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1863(b)(2) (1994).
144. Indeed, the JSSA itself recognizes that voter rolls may need to be supplemented
with other lists if their use does not achieve a fair cross-section. 28 U.S.C. §
1863(b)(2) (1994).
145. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979) ("Such a gross
discrepancy between the percentage of women in jury venires and the percentage
of women in the community requires the conclusion that women were not
fairly represented .... "); United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130,
1140 (D. Or. 1976) ("The voting list is not the end sought but only the means
used to ensure that all cognizable groups within the populace are represented
Baltimore Law Review
A second basis upon which courts have upheld the continued
use of voter registration lists is that those people on the list are
randomly chosen for jury duty. 146This reasoning again imports equal-
protection concepts into the fair cross-section analysis. The absence
of purposeful discrimination in selecting names from the list is
irrelevant to the issue of whether the resultant pool evidences a fair
cross-section of the community. Again, the courts are confusing
equal-protection claims, where purposeful discrimination must be
shown, with Sixth Amendment challenges, where no intent is neces-
sary. 147
A third basis that the courts have relied upon to support the
continued use of voter registration lists is that any change in lists
will create "confusion and administrative nightmare"' 48 and will open
the door to challenges in all circuits that use voter registration lists. 149
As this Article reveals, however, the administrative costs of using
multiple source lists are not substantial, and many jurisdictions have
used multiple source lists successfully. 150
Finally, Maryland courts have been skeptical that driver's license
lists would be more representative of the community than voter
registration lists."S1 The data collected during the development of this
on juries. The voting list cannot be adequate if some groups are significantly
under-represented .... ").
146. See Moore v. State, 84 Md. App. 165, 170-71, 578 A.2d 304, 306 (1990)
(reasoning that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred because there was no
suggestion that the jury was hand-picked) (citing Wilkins v. State, 16 Md.
App. 587, 300 A.2d 411 (1973), cert. denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256
(1990)); Bailey v. State, 63 Md. App. 594, 601, 493 A.2d 396, 399 (citing
Wilkins, 16 Md. App. at 596-97, 300 A.2d at 416-17 (finding random selection
is fair selection)), cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985); Miller v.
State, 53 Md. App. 1, 12, 452 A.2d 180, 186 (1982) (holding that because
names were randomly drawn, there was no systematic exclusion under the Sixth
Amendment).
147. Therefore, the reasoning in United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1449 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988), that there was no taint by "some
affirmative form of discrimination" by using the voter registration list, is
irrelevant.
148. Id. at 1454.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (discussing costs and adminis-
trative aspects of multiple source lists).
151. See Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1453-54 ("It seems fair for us to assume that whites
are over-represented on such driver registration lists. In any event, there is no
assurance that African-Americans will be represented more proportionately on
those lists than on the voter registration lists."); see also Moore v. State, 84
Md. App. 165, 171, 578 A.2d 304, 307 ("We are urged by the appellants to
hold that the list of registered motor vehicle owners would have produced a
more likely 'representative cross-section of Prince George's County adult citi-
zens.' That conclusion by appellants is unsupported and constitutes no more
than sheer speculation."), cert. denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256 (1990).
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Article clearly rebuts this assertion. 52 Driver's license lists are sub-
stantially more inclusive than voter registration lists, and disparities
between the percentage of minorities on those roles and the general
population as reflected in Census data are negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
The method of statistical analysis of jury disparities proposed
in this Article will produce consistent and reliable results, regardless
of any group's size as a percentage of the total population. By using
this method to analyze data collected in Maryland, this Article has
shown that significant racial disparities exist in the composition of
juries in all but one of the counties studied. These disparities would
disappear if the source list of voter registration roles were supple-
mented with driver rolls. Although this remedy is inexpensive and
simple to administrate, Maryland courts have refused to adopt this
remedy and have instead applied inaccurate reasoning to defend the
use of voter rolls as the only source for the creation of jury lists. If
Maryland is to provide representative juries to its citizens, the courts
must take a fresh look at the issue and must reevaluate their reason-
ing.
152. See supra part V.
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Table 1
RACIAL DISPARITIES
(076 African-American)
Anne Arundel County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 11.00070 6.3007o 1198 -4.70% -42.730
1980 10.900o 4.800o 314 -6.10% -55.96%o
1981 11.00% 7.300o 287 -3.70%o -33.64%
1982 11.00% 4.80% 292 -6.20% -56.3607o
1983 11.10076 8.700o 300 -2.40% -21.6207o
Baltimore County
Year. Pop Jury N AD CD
1988 12.18% 4.89% 225 -7.29% -59.85%
1989 12.18% 5.93% 364 -6.25% -51.31%
1990 12.18% 5.94% 185 -6.24% -51.23%
1991 12.1807 2.23%q0 134 -9.95% -81.69%
1992 12.180o 4.550o 3556 -7.63% -62.640o
1993 12.18% 6.930o 1790 -5.25% -43.10%
Caroline County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 15.80% 10.80% 3999 -5.00% -31.65%
1986 15.90% 12.0007o 574 -3.90% -24.530o
1987 15.90% 9.60% 591 -6.30% -39.62%
1988 15.80% 11.70% 546 -4.1007 -25.95%
1989 15.800o 10.30% 623 -5.50% -34.81%
1990 15.80% 13.000o 644 -2.8007o -17.72%
1991 15.70% 9.60% 687 -6.10% -38.85%
1992 15.7007o 8.40% 323 -7.30% -46.50%
Charles County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 17.7% 12.4% 1818 -5.3% -29.9%
1989 17.7% 13.3% 248 -4.4% -24.90o
1990 17.7% 14.80o 472 -2.9% -16.4%
1991 17.706 10.407o 376 -7.3% -41.2%
1992 17.70o 11.3% 409 -6.4o -36.2%
1993 17.70o 11.9% 310 -5.8o -32.8%o
Dorchester County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 27.00% 22.60% 1185 -4.4007 -16.30%
1983 27.200o 18.50% 260 -8.70% -31.990o
1984 27.10% 21.10% 261 -6.000o -22.1407o
1985 26.90% 24.80% 274 -2.10% -7.81%
1986 26.8007 24.80% 391 -2.00% -7.46%
Montgomery County 1979-1983
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 8.70% 4.70% 44722 -4.0007o -45.98%
z P
5.20 .000001
3.47 .0010
2.00 .05
3.39 .001
1.32 .17
z P
3.34 .001
3.65 .0005
2.60 .01
3.52 .0008
13.91 .000000
6.79 .000000
z P
8.67 .000000
2.56 .02
4.19 .00006
2.63 .01
3.76 .0003
1.95 .06
4.39 .00003
3.61 .0006
z P
5.92 .000000
1.82 .02
1.65 .10
3.71 .0004
3.39 .001
2.68 .01
z *P
3.41 .001
3.15 .003
2.18 .04
.78 .29
.89 .27
z P
30.01 .000000
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Prince
Year
All
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
County
Jury
24.50%
22.60%
21.40%
19.30%
20.50%
29.90%
31.40%
N
2175
505
379
275
264
411
341
AD
-13.80%
-12.10%
-14.70%
-18.30%
-18.50%
-10.60%
-10.50O/o
CD
-36.03%
-34.87%
-40.72%
-48.67%
-47.44%
-26.17%
-25.06%
z
13.24
5.71
5.96
6.27
6.16
4.38
3.93
163
P
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.00003
.0002
Percent African-American in population according to Census
Percent African-American in jury pool
Number of jurors
Absolute disparity
Comparative disparity
Z-score - a test of significance
Probability difference occurred by chance
George's
Pop
38.30%
34.70%
36.10%
37.60%
39.00%
40.50%
41.90%
LEGEND
Pop-
Jury -
N-
AD-
CD-
Z -
p -
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Table 2
AGE DISPARITIES
(06 18-29)
Anne Arundel County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 33.000o 21.80% 1364 -11.20% -33.9407o
1980 33.70% 23.60% 348 -10.10% -29.97%
1981 33.2007o 21.90% 310 -11.30% -34.04%
1982 32.70% 20.90% 326 -11.80% -36.09%
1983 32.30% 20.40% 373 -11.90% -36.84%
Baltimore County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
1988 24.0007o 19.06% 299 -4.9407o -20.5807o
1989 24.00% 21.03% 504 -2.97% -12.37%
1990 24.0007o 17.7107o 463 -6.29% -26.21%
1991 24.0007o 16.62076 403 -7.38% -30.75%
1992 24.000o 15.88% 14448 -8.12% -33.8307o
1993 24.00% 21.20% 9260 -2.80o -11.67%
Caroline County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 26.30% 14.20076 4251 -12.100o -46.01%
1986 27.50% 15.30% 652 -12.20% -44.3607
1987 27.10% 15.90% 668 -11.2007o -41.33%
1988 26.7007o 13.4007o 626 -13.3007o -49.81%
1989 26.30% 14.40% 678 -11.90% -45.25%
1990 25.9007o 13.00%1o 663 -12.90% -49.81%
1991 25.50% 14.70% 645 -10.80% -42.35%
1992 25.10% 10.70% 310 -14.40% -57.37%
Dorchester County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 27.30% 21.7076 1200 -5.60% -20.51%1o
1983 27.90% 21.70% 263 -6.20% -22.22%
1984 27.500o 20.50% 263 -7.0007 -25.450o
1985 27.10% 22.500o 276 -4.600o -16.97%
1986 26.70% 21.9007o 398 -4.80% -17.9807o
Prince George's County
Year Pop Jury N AD CD
All 35.2007 24.10% 3198 -11.10% -31.53%
1979 34.90% 26.800%6 425 -8.1007 -23.2107o
1980 36.20o 22.70% 603 -13.50% -37.29o
1981 35.700o 27.1007 454 -8.60% -24.09%
1982 35.20% 23.50% 344 -11.70% -33.240o
1983 34.7006 20.4076 362 -14.30% -41.21%
1984 34.30% 22.3007 561 -12.000o -34.99%
1985 33.80% 26.30% 448 -7.50% -22.19%
z P
8.80 .000000
3.99 .0001
4.22 .00005
4.54 .00001
4.91 .000002
z P
2.00 .05
1.56 .12
3.17 .00
3.47 .001
22.85 .000000
6.31 .000000
z P
17.92 .000000
6.98 .000000
6.51 .000000
7.52 .000000
7.04 .000000
7.58 .000000
6.29 .000000
5.85 .000000
z P
4.35 .00003
2.24 .03
2.54 .02
1.72 .09
2.16 .04
z P
13.14 .000000
3.50 .0009
6.90 .000000
3.82 .0003
4.54 .00001
5.72 .000000
5.99 .000000
3.36 .001
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LEGEND
Pop-
Jury -
N-
AD-
CD-
P-
Percent 18-29 in population according to
Percent 18-29 in jury pool
Number of jurors
Absolute disparity
Comparative disparity
Z-score - a test of significance
Probability difference occurred by chance
Census
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Table 3
DISPARITIES USING MOTOR VEHICLE LIST
(Non-Caucasian, age 18-69)
(1991 Motor Vehicles Administration Data)
Census MVA AD CD
Anne Arundel 13.86 12.20 -1.66 -11.98
Baltimore County 14.81 15.92 1.11 7.49
Charles 20.1 19.3 -0.8 - 4.0
Caroline 16.62 14.17 -2.45 -14.74
Dorchester 27.14 25.26 -1.88 - 6.93
Montgomery 23.11 19.20 -3.91 -20.36
Prince George's 55.37 54.07 -1.30 - 2.35
Age-%18-29
Anne Arundel 28.99 27.47 -1.52 - 5.24
Baltimore County 24.00 25.7 1.77 7.36
Caroline 25.92 24.73 -1.19 - 4.59
Dorchester 24.54 24.88 0.34 1.39
Montgomery 26.65 27.21 0.56 2.10
Prince George's 33.32 29.53 -3.79 -11.37
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Table 4
REGISTERED VOTERS AND LICENSED DRIVERS
Pop Regis Driv Lic % Pop 076 Pop
18+ Voters 18+ Reg Driv
(1990) (1991) (1991) Voters Lic
Anne Arundel 322,051 181,888 309,085 56.5% 96.0%
Baltimore County 540,972 336,957 521,985 62.3% 96.4%
Caroline 19,935 9,229 19,519 46.3% 97.9%
Charles 71,398 44,948 70,771 62.9% 99.1%
Dorchester 23,319 12,608 21,265 54.1% 91.2%
Montgomery 578,783 360,865 575,879 62.3% 99.5%
Pr. George's 551,323 270,109 493,508 49.0% 89.5%
Table 5
VOTER REGISTRATION RATES BY RACE
(Maryland)
Caucasian
68.3%
67.5%
71.0%
62.4%
64.6%
60.7%
74.607o
African-American
61.30o
61.407o
65.00o
58.007o
64.50o
44.40o
66.407o
Differential
7.0%
6.1%
6.0%
4.4%
0.1%
16.3%
8.2%
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
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